The Internal Confrontation of Latin American Constitutionalism: Colombia

Abstract

Introduction: The new Latin American constitutionalism, within the framework of neo-constitutionalism, grants the Constitution binding normative power, overcoming its former conception as a mere political declaration. This model promotes the inclusion of fundamental rights, citizen participation, and democratic oversight, addressing the structural deficiencies of traditional democracies in the region. Methodology: The study used an exploratory and theoretical methodology based on doctrinal, normative, and jurisprudential analysis of the Colombian case. The 1991 Constitution was specifically examined, understood as a product of the new constitutionalism. Results: An internal tension was identified in the Colombian constitutional design: on the one hand, democracy and citizen participation are strengthened; on the other, a robust model of judicial oversight is consolidated. Discussion: This tension between democracy and constitutional oversight tends to be resolved when the rigid vision of the separation of powers is overcome. In Colombia, the judicial role has grown as a means of expressing social demands, displacing representative democracy. Conclusions: The new constitutionalism has strengthened the judiciary in Colombia, making it a guarantor of rights and a central platform for democratic debate, although at the cost of weakening traditional channels of political representation.